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In 1662, in The Case of Thomas Tong and Others,  [1] which involved charges of 
treason against several defendants, the judges of the King's Bench conferred on a 
crucial set of points of procedure.   As reported by one of the judges, Sir John 
Kelyng, the judges agreed unanimously that a pretrial confession made to the 
authorities was evidence against the Party himself who made the Confession, and 
indeed, if adequately proved could support a conviction of that party without 
additional witnesses to the treason itself.  But -- again unanimously, and quite 
definitively -- the judges also agreed that the confession cannot be made use of as 
evidence against any others whom on his Examination he confessed to be in the 
Treason.  [2] 
In 1791, the United States of America amended its new Constitution to provide, 
also in rather simple terms, that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.  [3]  In 1999, 
the United States Supreme Court faced another capital case, this one for murder, in 
Lilly v. Virginia.  [4]  The critical evidence in Lilly was an accomplice's pretrial 
confession to the authorities:  [5] One Mark Lilly had given a statement to the 
police in which he identified his brother Benjamin, the defendant, as the 
triggerman in the murder, which was part of a crime spree in which both brothers 
and a third man had participated.  Although Mark did not testify at Benjamin's 
trial, the trial court admitted his pretrial statement, and Benjamin was convicted. 
The Virginia Supreme Court upheld the conviction.   The United States Supreme 
Court was split on admissibility of Mark’s statement. Four Justices B the Chief 
Justice joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy and, in substantial part, by 
Justice Thomas B were not satisfied that the Virginia courts had acted properly in 
allowing Mark's statement into evidence, but were also not sure that those courts 
had violated Benjamin's confrontation right.  They would have remanded the case 
to the Virginia courts for a more detailed analysis of the facts.  [6]  Five Justices, 
however, concluded that admitting the confession violated Benjamin's rights.  A 
plurality of four, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, reached this result only after an 
extensive analysis, in accordance with prevailing confrontation doctrine, of the 
reliability of the statement.  One of the four, Justice Breyer, raised serious doubts 
about that doctrine, however, and emphasized that the door was open for a much 
different approach to confrontation.  Only Justice Scalia, who had joined an earlier 
attempt by Justice Thomas to reconceptualize confrontation theory, saw the case in 
simple,  Tong-like terms, characterizing the admission of Mark's statement in a 
one-paragraph opinion as a paradigmatic Confrontation Clause violation."  [7] 
This is not, in my view, a happy story of the progress of human liberty over the 
last three and a half centuries.   I believe the Tong court had a clearer conception 
of what the confrontation right means – and meant even then, long before the 
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution expressed it – than does most of the current 
Court.  The right, one of the great glories of the Anglo-American system of 
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adjudication, expresses the conditions under which testimonial statements must be 
given if they are to be acceptable proof against a criminal defendant.   Recent 
Supreme Court doctrine has so deeply enshrouded the right  in the mysteries of 
hearsay law that it has been all but lost.  But Lilly also gives reason for hope, for 
Justices Scalia, Breyer, and Thomas have indicated that they are willing to think 
anew about what the confrontation right means and how it should be applied.  [8] 
In the first portion of this brief essay I will discuss Lilly against the backdrop of 
prevailing confrontation doctrine.  I will focus on the opinions of Justices Stevens 
and Chief Justice Rehnquist, which purported to apply this doctrine, and I will 
argue that it is inadequate.   In the second part of the essay, I will   argue that the 
opinions of Justices Breyer and Scalia point the way to a sounder conception of 
the confrontation right: Lilly was as clear-cut as Justice Scalia made it seem,  [9] 
as becomes apparent under the type of approach for which Justice Breyer indicated 
sympathy.   My own preference for such an approach will not surprise anyone 
familiar with the amicus brief, cited by Justice Breyer, that two co-authors and I 
submitted on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union.
I.
Under prevailing doctrine, the key question  applying the Confrontation Clause to 
an out-of-court statements is whether the statement is reliable.  [10]  Following 
Ohio v. Roberts  [11] , the courts first must determine whether the statement fits 
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception and, if it does not, whether there are 
sufficient particularized guarantees of trustworthiness to warrant admissibility 
notwithstanding the lack of confrontation.
In affirming Benjamin Lilly's conviction, the Virginia Supreme Court held that 
Mark's statements fit within the Commonwealth's hearsay exception for statements 
made against the penal interest of the declarant.  Federal Rule of Evidence 
804(b)(3) includes an exception for some declarations against penal interest, as 
does the evidentiary law of most states.  Nevertheless, in the two lead opinions in 
the United States Supreme Court, Justice Stevens and the Chief Justice each
repeated the Court's pronouncement in Lee v. Illinois that the simple 
categorization of a statement as a ’declaration against penal interest’ . . . defines 
too large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis.  [12] As in Lee, 
that statement is a remarkable  confession of difficulty. Roberts had said that the 
reliability requirement could be satisfied without more if a statement fits within a 
firmly rooted hearsay exception.  The Lee statement appears to say, in essence, 
that even if most American jurisdictions articulate an exception in concise terms –
as is true with respect to the exception for statements against penal interest and all 
the other exceptions listed in Federal Rules of Evidence 803 and 804 – the Court 
might decide to dissect the exception, deeming the Roberts reliability requirement 
to be satisfied “without more” by some, but not all, sub-categories of statements 
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that some courts have deemed to be within the exception.   Though Roberts aimed 
at simplifying the law, its rubric thus ultimately requires the courts to resolve two 
difficult questions as a matter of federal constitutional law: Within what bounds, if 
any, should the given exception be considered firmly rooted?  Do the particular 
statements at issue fit within those bounds?
Chief Justice Rehnquist focused on the second of these issues.  He believed that 
the portions of Mark's statements against his penal interest were so far removed in 
time and place from the statements pointing to Benjamin as the triggerman that the 
latter simply could not be considered as declarations against penal interest for 
Confrontation Clause purposes.   Thus, he concluded that there was no need for 
the Court to make a categorical pronouncement denying the possibility that some 
statements that inculpate both the declarant and the defendant might be considered 
to be within a firmly rooted exception.  [13]  On behalf of the plurality, however, 
Justice Stevens did make such a pronouncement, for he focused on the first of the 
questions.  After a long exegesis on the exception for statements against penal 
interest, he declared that accomplices' confessions that inculpate a criminal 
defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the rule against hearsay as 
that concept has been defined in our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.  [14] 
That was not the end of the matter, however. Under prevailing doctrine, the 
statements might still have satisfied the reliability requirement of Roberts if they 
were supported by sufficient particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.  In 
applying state hearsay law, the Virginia Supreme Court concluded that the 
statements were reliable in the context of the facts and circumstances under which 
[they were] given.  [15]  The plurality in the Supreme Court, however, refused B
over the protest of the Rehnquist group B to hold that appellate courts should defer 
to lower courts' determinations regarding whether a hearsay statement has 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.  [16]  Though they recognized that 
the matter was a fact-intensive one, they believed that independent review was 
necessary to clarify and control application of the principles underlying the 
constitutional protection.  [17]  Justice Stevens therefore embarked on a fact-
intensive review to determine whether Mark Lilly's statements were supported by 
sufficient particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, and he concluded that they 
were not.
In accordance with Idaho v. Wright, the plurality confined its inquiry concerning 
indicia of the statements’ reliability to those that indicated their inherent 
reliability.  [18]  Inherent reliability sounds like a rather metaphysical standard, 
but it is clearly meant to prevent the courts from using corroborative evidence to 
support conclusions about reliability B despite the fact, well articulated by Justice 
Kennedy in dissent in Wright, that it is a matter of common sense for most people 
that one of the best ways to determine whether what someone says is trustworthy 
is to see if it is corroborated by other evidence.  [19]  In that light, the Court's 
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reason for excluding corroboration from the inquiry must remain, to some extent, a 
matter of speculation.  Two partial explanations seem fairly plausible:  First, if 
courts could rely on corroboration,  the test would essentially be whether the court 
believed the statement, which in many cases would be essentially whether the 
court believes the defendant to be guilty.  Second, requiring courts to base their 
conclusions on corroborative evidence would make the inquiry even more 
intensely fact-dependent.  [20] 
Under the  Roberts rubric, then, Lilly was a rather difficult case.  First, the Court 
had to compare the statements at issue to a hearsay exception, deciding whether 
the statements fit within whatever portion of the exception the Court would deem 
to be firmly rooted for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.  Once the plurality
[21] and the Chief Justice's group concluded that the statements did not fit such a 
category,  [22] , they had to determine whether the statement was supported by 
sufficient particularized guarantees of trustworthiness to overcome the lack of 
confrontation B but in making that judgment, they  were precluded from relying 
on a source of information, corroborative evidence, to which one would normally 
look in assessing trustworthiness.
The difficulty, in my opinion, is that the Court has perceived the confrontation 
right as primarily a means of guaranteeing the trustworthiness of evidence.  It is 
difficult to make any useful generalizations about trustworthiness because it 
depends so much on the facts of the particular case.  The Court has, accordingly, 
been  caught between two alternatives:  first,  relying on the common exceptions 
to the rule against hearsay for broad generalizations about trustworthiness that are 
not particularly useful or at least not particularly dependable, and, second, 
deciding each case on its facts.   Neither technique is satisfactory in itself, and the 
Court has chosen to use each to some extent.  [23]  The result is that, in addition 
to other problems, Confrontation Clause jurisprudence becomes quite complex.
[24] 
II.
Should Lilly have been so difficult?  Justice Scalia's brief opinion suggests that it 
should not have been, and that both Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Rehnquist 
overlooked some basic principle that should have made the case easy:
During a custodial interrogation, Mark Lilly told police officers that 
petitioner committed the charged murder.  The prosecution introduced a tape 
recording of these statements at trial without making Mark available for 
cross-examination.  In my view, that is a paradigmatic Confrontation Clause 
violation. . . .  Since the violation is clear, the case need be remanded only 
for a harmless-error determination.  [25] 
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Justice Scalia did not attempt to articulate a guiding principle, however.
Ironically, though Justice Stevens' opinion adhered to the reliability-based 
orthodoxy and refused to speak in categorical terms, it did point towards 
glimmerings of such a principle:
It is highly unlikely that the presumptive unreliability that attaches to 
accomplices' confessions that shift or spread blame can be effectively 
rebutted when the statements are given under conditions that implicate the 
core concerns of the old ex parte affidavit practice B that is, when the 
government is involved in the statements' production, and when the 
statements describe past events and have not been subjected to adversarial 
testing.  [26]
Although he joined the plurality opinion, Justice Breyer wrote separately to 
suggest that Confrontation Clause jurisprudence might be improved by severing its 
link to hearsay doctrine and recognizing that the Clause was principally meant to 
protect the right of an accused to meet his accusers face to face rather than the 
trustworthiness of evidence.  [27]  I agree.  And if the full Court accepts this 
principle, we will have come a long way towards understanding the confrontation 
right.
The confrontation right expresses the insistence of the Anglo-American system 
that testimony be given under oath, face-to-face with the adverse party, and, if 
feasible, in open court. Not all systems require that testimony be given in this 
manner.  In later ancient Greek procedure, for example, witnesses testified in 
writing.  Medieval continental systems took testimony out  of the presence of the 
parties.  [28]  Indeed, although the open and confrontational style of giving 
testimony has been characteristic of English trials for more than half a millennium, 
the accused’s right to insist on it was often assaulted until the middle of the 
seventeenth century.  The case of Walter Raleigh is the most notorious 
prosecution, but not the only one, in which defendants pleaded unsuccessfully that 
their accusers should be brought face to face with them.
In this light, I think we can see what the Confrontation Clause is all about: It is not 
a generalized rule against hearsay, subject to exceptions.  Rather, it is a structural 
rule meant to ensure that a witness against an accused testifies only in the manner 
approved by the common law system B under oath and in the presence of the 
accused, so that the accused may examine her.  The Clause covers not all hearsay 
declarants, but only witnesses B those who give testimony.
But what does testimony mean?  I will postpone an answer briefly by making one 
preliminary note: An out-of-court statement may be testimonial, even if it is made 
informally, not under oath.  The informality does not make the statement non-
testimonial.  Rather, it only means that the statement is not acceptable testimony.
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The whole point of the Clause is to ensure that testimony be given under 
appropriate conditions.  If a statement is genuinely testimonial, the absence of one 
of those conditions B for example, the oath B does not mean that the Clause does 
not apply and therefore that other conditions B particularly cross-examination B
need not be satisfied.
 So, what makes a statement genuinely testimonial for analysis of the 
confrontation right?   A precise definition is not easy, but I think the basic idea is 
this:  If the circumstances are such that a reasonable person would realize that the 
statement will likely be used in investigation or prosecution of a crime, then the 
statement is testimonial.  No matter how informal the context of the statement may 
be, if the speaker makes it understanding that it will be used against a criminal 
defendant, she is acting as a witness against the defendant.  Any system that 
admits such a statement thereby tolerates informal means of testimony, which the 
Confrontation Clause is meant to preclude.
I do not pretend that all cases will be easy under this approach.  With respect to 
some statements made to a private listener, for example, there may be a close 
question as to whether a reasonable person in the declarant's position would 
anticipate that the listener would pass the statement on to the police.  But a test is 
not bad simply because it yields hard cases; sometimes the right question leads to 
a difficult answer.  Moreover, this test shows why a case like Lilly is not hard.
Mark Lilly was speaking directly to the authorities, who he knew were 
investigating a murder.  He also knew that the authorities understood him to be in 
a position to offer information on the murder B and he did just that by identifying 
the triggerman.  Obviously, he was in a position to understand that this 
information was of investigative interest to the police and that, if the system 
allowed, his statement could be used at trial.  When his statement was admitted at 
trial, therefore, it meant that Mark Lilly had testified against a criminal defendant 
by making a statement to the police, neither under oath nor subject to cross-
examination.   And this the Confrontation Clause clearly prohibits.
The Confrontation Clause should not be viewed as a flabby doctrine applicable to 
all hearsay but excluding only that portion of it perceived to be trustworthy.
Rather, the Clause reflects a narrow but categorical rule:  Anyone who testifies 
against an accused must do so in the way demanded for centuries by the common 
law system of criminal justice, openly, in the presence of the accused, under oath, 
and subject to adverse examination.   This right is subject to forfeiture.   For 
example, the accused cannot complain about his inability to cross-examine the 
witness at trial if he has rendered her unable to testify there, say by killing her.
[29] But apart from that narrow qualification, the right should be regarded as 
absolute, still one of the pillars of our system.
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Endnotes
*  Ralph W. Aigler Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.  Many 
thanks to Craig Callen for numerous valuable suggestions and to Frank Herrmann 
for steering me straight on medieval procedures.
 [1]  84 Eng. Rep. 1061 (1662).
 [2]  84 Eng. Rep at 1062.
 [3]  U.S. Const. amend VI.
 [4]  527 U.S. 116 (1999).
 [5] Id. at 121.
 [6] Id.  at 148 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
 [7] Id. at 143. (Scalia, J., concurring).
 [8] See Comment, Confrontation Clause B "Firmly Rooted" Hearsay Exceptions, 
113 HARV. L. Rev., 233, 243-44 (1999) (saying that Lilly "should prompt the sort 
of reevaluation of the Court's hearsay-based Confrontation Clause jurisprudence 
that Justice Breyer imagined in his concurrence").
 [9] Lilly, 527 U.S. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring).
 [10] In some circumstances, the prosecution is also required to show that the 
declarant is unavailable.   In recent cases, the Court has generally minimized the 
importance of unavailability.  In Lilly, it put the issue aside by assuming that, 
because he was asserting the privilege against self-incrimination, Mark Lilly was 
unavailable.  I will make the same assumption.  I will also put aside the possibility 
B because it is not one that the courts addressed B that Mark asserted the privilege 
because of persuasion or inducement by Benjamin or someone acting in his 
interests.
 [11] 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
 [12] Lilly,  527 U.S. at 127 (plurality opinion)(quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 
530, 544 n.5 (1986);) id.. at 145 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
 [13] Id. at 146.
 [14] Id. at 134 (plurality opinion)..
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 [15] 255 Va. 558, 574, 499 S.E.2d 522, 534 (1998).   Because the Virginia court 
had drawn this conclusion in the context of state hearsay law rather than the 
particularized guarantees test under the Confrontation Clause, four Justices B the 
Rehnquist group of three, see Lilly,  527 U.S. at 148, and apparently also Justice 
Thomas, id. at 148 B would have remanded for a determination under that test.
Justice Stevens concluded that a remand was unnecessary. Id. at 135 n.6.
 [16] Lilly, 527 U.S. at 136.
 [17] Id..
 [18] 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990).
 [19] Id. at 828.
 [20] See  Richard D. Friedman, The Elements of Evidence 326 (2d ed. 1998).
 [21] Lilly, 527 U.S. at 134.
 [22] Id.. at 145 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring.).
 [23]  For example, in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), the Court relied on 
the very dubious psychological generalizations underlying the spontaneous 
declaration and medical statement exceptions to hold that the Confrontation 
Clause was not violated.  In other cases, including Lee and Idaho v. Wright, as 
well as Lilly, the justices, having not found the statements to fit within a firmly 
rooted exception, have engaged in a case-specific determination of 
trustworthiness.
 [24] For a fuller exploration of the inadequacy of trustworthiness as the 
touchstone for Confrontation Clause analysis, see Richard D. Friedman, 
Confrontation:  The Search for Basic Principles, 86 Georgetown L.J. 1011, 1027-
29 (1998).  I also believe that trustworthiness is a poor criterion in general for 
determining the admissibility of hearsay. See Richard D. Friedman, Truth and Its 
Rivals in the Law of Hearsay and Confrontation, 49 Hastings L.J. 545, 552-56 
(1998).
 [25] Lilly, 527 U.S. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment).
 [26] Id. at 137 (plurality opinion).
 [27] Id. at 140.
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 [28] Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow Speer, Facing the Accuser:  Ancient & 
Medieval Precursors of the Confrontation Clause, 34 Va. J. Int'l  L. 481, 515-16 
(1994).  Under these systems, however, the parties did have the right to be present 
when the witnesses were sworn. Id. at 518-19.
 [29] I explore the issues related to forfeiture in Confrontation and the Definition 
of Chutzpa, 31 Israel L. Rev. 506 (1997).
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